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Abstract
Recent work has uncovered the interesting (and somewhat surprising) finding that
training models to be invariant to adversarial perturbations requires substantially
larger datasets than those required for standard classification. This result is a key
hurdle in the deployment of robust machine learning models in many real world
applications where labeled data is expensive. Our main insight is that unlabeled
data can be a competitive alternative to labeled data for training adversarially robust
models. Theoretically, we show that in a simple statistical setting, the sample
complexity for learning an adversarially robust model from unlabeled data matches
the fully supervised case up to constant factors. On standard datasets like CIFAR-
10, a simple Unsupervised Adversarial Training (UAT) approach using unlabeled
data improves robust accuracy by 21.7% over using 4K supervised examples alone,
and captures over 95% of the improvement from the same number of labeled
examples. Finally, we report an improvement of 4% over the previous state-of-the-
art on CIFAR-10 against the strongest known attack by using additional unlabeled
data from the uncurated 80 Million Tiny Images dataset. This demonstrates that
our finding extends as well to the more realistic case where unlabeled data is also
uncurated, therefore opening a new avenue for improving adversarial training.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has revolutionized many areas of research such as natural language processing, speech
recognition or computer vision. System based on these techniques are now being developed and
deployed for a wide variety of applications, from recommending/ranking content on the web [12, 20]
to autonomous driving [6] and even in medical diagnostics [13]. The safety-critical nature of some of
these tasks necessitates the need for ensuring that the deployed models are robust and generalize well
to all sorts of variations that can occur in the inputs. Yet, it has been shown that the commonly used
deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in the input [40], e.g. it is possible
to fool an image classifier into predicting arbitrary classes by carefully choosing perturbations
imperceptible to the human eye.
Since the discovery of these results, many approaches have been developed to prevent this type of
behaviour. One of the most effective and popular approaches is known as supervised adversarial
training [16, 27] which works by generating adversarial samples in an online manner through an
inner optimization procedure and then using them to augment the standard training set. Despite
substantial work in this space, accuracy of classifiers on adversarial inputs remains much lower than
that on normal inputs. Recent theoretical work has offered a reason for this discrepancy, and argues
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that training models to be invariant to adversarial perturbations requires substantially larger datasets
than those required for the standard classification task [38].
This result is a key hurdle in the development and deployment of robust machine learning models
in many real world applications where labeled data is expensive. Our central hypothesis is that
additional unlabeled examples may suffice for adversarial robustness. Intuitively, this is based on
two related observations, explained in Sections 3 and 4.1.2. First, adversarial robustness depends on
the smoothness of the classifier around natural images, which can be estimated from unlabeled data.
Second, only a relatively small amount of labeled data is needed for standard generalization. Thus, if
adversarial training is robust to label noise, labels from supervised examples can be propagated to
unsupervised examples to train a smoothed classifier with improved adversarial robustness.
Motivated by this, we explore Unsupervised Adversarial Training (UAT) to use unlabeled data for
adversarial training. We study this algorithm in a simple theoretical setting, proposed by [38] to study
adversarial generalization. We show that once we are given a single labeled example, the sample
complexity of UAT matches the fully supervised case up to constant factors. In independent and
concurrent work, [9, 49, 30] also study the use of unlabeled data for improving adversarial robustness,
which we discuss in Section 2.
Experimentally, we find strong support for our main hypothesis. On CIFAR-10 and SVHN, with
very limited annotated data, our method reaches robust accuracies of 54.1% and 84.4% respectively
against the FGSM20 attack [23]. These numbers represent a significant improvement over purely
supervised approaches (32.5% and 66.0%) on same amount of data and almost match methods that
have access to full supervision (55.5% and 86.2%), capturing over 95% of their improvement, without
labels. Further, we show that we can successfully leverage realistically obtained unsupervised and
uncurated data to improve the state-of-the-art on CIFAR-10 at ε = 8/255 from 52.58% to 56.30%
against the strongest known attack.
Contributions. (i) In Section 3, we propose a simple and theoretically grounded strategy, UAT, to
leverage unsupervised data for adversarial training. (ii) We provide, in Section 4.1, strong empirical
support for our initial hypothesis that unlabeled data can be competitive with labeled data when it
comes to training adversarially robust classifiers, therefore opening a new avenue for improving
adversarial training. (iii) Finally, by leveraging noisy and uncurated data obtained from web queries,
we set a new state-of-the-art on CIFAR-10 without depending on any additional human labeling.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Robustness. [4, 40] observed that neural networks which achieve extremely high
accuracy on a randomly sampled test set may nonetheless be vulnerable to adversarial examples,
or small but highly optimized perturbations of the data which cause misclassification. Since then,
many papers have proposed a wide variety of defenses to the so-called adversarial attacks, though
few have proven robust against stronger attacks [1, 7, 43]. One of the most successful approaches for
obtaining classifiers that are adversarially robust is adversarial training [1, 43]. Adversarial training
directly minimizes the adversarial risk by approximately solving an inner maximization problem
by projected gradient descent (PGD) to generate small perturbations that increase the prediction
error, and uses these perturbed examples for training [16, 23, 27]. The TRADES approach in [50]
improves these results by instead minimizing a surrogate loss which upper bounds the adversarial
risk. Their objective is very similar to the one used in UAT-OT (UAT with online targets introduced
in Section 3.1) but is estimated purely on labeled rather than unlabeled data.
Common to all these approaches, a central challenge is adversarial generalization. For example, on
CIFAR-10 with a perturbation of ε = 8/255, the adversarially trained model in [27] achieves an
adversarial accuracy of 46%, despite near 100% adversarial accuracy on the train set. For comparison,
standard models can achieve natural accuracy of 96% on CIFAR-10 [48]. Recent work has argued
that adversarial generalization may require more data than natural generalization [38]. One solution
explored in [19] is to use pretraining on ImageNet, a large supervised dataset, to improve adversarial
robustness. In this work, we study whether more labeled data is necessary, or whether unlabeled data
can suffice. While to our knowledge, this question has not been directly studied, several works such
as [18, 37, 39] propose using generative models to detect or denoise adversarial examples, which can
in principle be learned on unlabeled data. However, so far, such approaches have not proven to be
robust to strong attacks [1, 43].
2
Semi-supervised learning. Learning from unlabeled data is an active area of research. The semi-
supervised learning approach [10] which, in addition to labeled data, also uses unlabeled data to
learn better models is particularly relevant to our work. One of the most effective technique for
semi-supervised learning is to use smoothness regularization: the model is trained to be invariant to
small perturbation applied to unsupervised samples [2, 3, 24, 29, 36, 47]. Of particular relevance to
UAT, [29] also uses adversarial perturbations to smooth the model outputs. In addition, co-training
[5] and recent extensions [11, 34] use the most confident predictions on unlabeled data to iteratively
construct additional labeled training data. These work all focus on improving standard generalization
whereas we explore the use of similar ideas in the context of adversarial generalization.
Semi-supervised learning for adversarial robustness. The observation that adversarial robustness
can be optimized without labels was made independently and concurrently by [9, 30, 49]. Of particular
interest, [9] proposes a meta-algorithm Robust Self-Training (RST), similar to UAT. Indeed, the
particular instantiation of RST used in [9] and the fixed-target variant of UAT are nearly equivalent:
the difference is whether the base algorithm minimizes the robust loss from [50] or the vanilla
adversarial training objective [27]. Their results also provide strong, independent evidence that
unlabeled and uncurated examples improve robustness on both CIFAR-10 and SVHN.
3 Unsupervised Adversarial Training (UAT)
In this section, we introduce and motivate our approach, Unsupervised Adversarial Training (UAT),
which enables the use of unlabeled data to train robust classifiers.
Notation. Consider the classification problem of learning a predictor fθ to map inputs x ∈ X to labels
y ∈ Y . In this work, f is of the form: fθ(x) = argmaxy∈Y pθ(y|x), where pθ(.|x) is parameterized
by a neural network. We assume data points (x, y) are i.i.d. samples from the data-generating joint
distribution P (X,Y ) over X × Y . P (X) denotes the unlabeled distribution over X obtained by
marginalizing out Y in P (X,Y ). We assume access to a labeled training set Sn = {(xi, yi)}1≤i≤n,
where (xi, yi) ∼ P (X,Y ) and an unlabeled training set Um = {xi}1≤i≤m, where xi ∼ P (X).
Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness. The natural risk is Lnat(θ) = E(x,y)∼P (X,Y ) `(y, fθ(x)),
where ` is the 0−1 loss. Our primary objective is minimizing adversarial risk: Ladv(θ) =
EP (X,Y ) supx′∈N(x) `(y, fθ(x
′)). As is common, the neighborhood N(x) is taken in this work to
be the L∞ ball: N(x) = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ }. Because the inner maximization cannot be solved
exactly, we report the surrogate adversarial risk Lg(θ) = EP (X,Y ) `(fθ(x′), y), where x′ = g(x, y, θ)
is an approximate solution to the inner maximization computed by some fixed adversary g. Typically,
g is (a variant of) projected gradient descent (PGD) with a fixed number of iterations.
3.1 Unsupervised Adversarial Training (UAT)
Motivation. As discussed in the introduction, a central challenge for adversarial training has been
the difficulty of adversarial generalization. Previous work has argued that adversarial generalization
may simply require more data than natural generalization. We ask a simple question: is more labeled
data necessary, or is unsupervised data sufficient? This is of particular interest in the common setting
where unlabeled examples are dramatically cheaper to acquire than labeled examples (m  n).
For example, for large-scale image classification problems, unlabeled examples can be acquired by
scraping images off the web, whereas gathering labeled examples requires hiring human labelers.
We now consider two algorithms to study this question. Both approaches are simple – we emphasize
the point that large unlabeled datasets can help bridge the gap between natural and adversarial
generalization. Later, in Sections 3.2 and 4, we show that both in a simple theoretical model and
empirically, unlabeled data is in fact competitive with labeled data. In other words, for a fixed number
of additional examples, we observe similar improvements in adversarial robustness regardless of
whether or not they are labeled.
Strategy 1: Unsupervised Adversarial Training with Online Targets (UAT-OT). We note
that adversarial risk can be bounded as Ladv = Lnat + (Ladv − Lnat) ≤ Lnat +
EP (X,Y ) supx′∈N(x) `(fθ(x
′), fθ(x)), similarly to the decomposition in [50]. We refer to the first
term as the classification loss, and the second terms as the smoothness loss. Even for adversarially
trained models, it has been observed that the smoothness loss dominates the classification loss on the
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test set, suggesting that controlling the smoothness loss is the key to adversarial generalization. For
example, the adversarially trained model in [27] achieves natural accuracy of 87% but adversarial
accuracy of 46% on CIFAR-10 at ε = 8/255.
Notably, the smoothness loss has no dependence on labels, and thus can be minimized purely through
unsupervised data. UAT-OT directly minimizes a differentiable surrogate of the smoothness loss on
the unlabeled data. Formally, we use the loss introduced in [29] and also used in [50]
LOTunsup(θ) = E
x∼P (X)
sup
x′∈N(x)
D(pθˆ(.|x), pθ(.|x′)), (1)
where D is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, and θˆ indicates a fixed copy of the parameters θ in order
to stop the gradients from propagating. While [29], which primarily focuses on natural generalization,
uses a single step approximation of the inner maximization, we use an iterative PGD adversary, since
prior work indicates strong adversaries are crucial for effective adversarial training [23, 27].
Strategy 2: Unsupervised Adversarial Training with Fixed Targets (UAT-FT). This strategy
directly leverages the gap between standard generalization and adversarial generalization. The main
idea is to first train a base classifier for standard generalization on the supervised set Sn. Then, this
model is used to estimate labels, hence fixed targets, on the unsupervised set Um. This allows us to
employ standard supervised adversarial training using these fixed targets. Formally, it corresponds to
using the following loss:
LFTunsup(θ) = E
x∼P (X)
sup
x′∈N(x)
xent(yˆ(x), pθ(.|x′)), (2)
where xent is the cross entropy loss and yˆ(x) is a pseudo-label obtained from a model trained for
standard generalization on Sn alone. Thus, provided a sufficiently large unlabeled dataset, UAT-FT
recovers a smoothed version of the base classifier, which matches the predictions of the base classifier
on clean data, while maintaining stability of the predictions within local neighborhoods of the data.
Overall training. For the overall objective, we use a weighted combination of the supervised loss
and the chosen unsupervised loss, controlled by a hyperparameter λ: L(θ) = Lsup(θ) + λLunsup(θ).
The unsupervised loss can be either LOTunsup (UAT-OT), LFTunsup (UAT-FT) or both (UAT++). Finally,
note that the unsupervised loss can also be used on the samples of the supervised set by simply adding
the xi’s of Sn in Um. The pseudocode and implmenetation details are described in Appendix A.1.
3.2 Theoretical model
To improve our understanding of the effects of unlabeled data, we study the simple setting proposed
by [38] to analyze the required sample complexity of adversarial robustness.
Definition 1 (Gaussian model [38]). Let θ∗ ∈ Rd be the per-class mean vector and let σ > 0 be the
variance parameter. Then the (θ∗, σ)-Gaussian model is defined by the following distribution over
(x, y) ∈ Rd ×{±1}: First, draw a label y ∈ {±1} uniformly at random. Then sample the data point
x ∈ Rd from N (y · θ∗, σ2I).
In [38], this setting was chosen to model the empirical observation that adversarial generalization
requires more data than natural generalization. They provide an algorithm which achieves fixed,
arbitrary (say, 1%) accuracy using a single sample. However, to achieve the same adversarial
accuracy, they show that any algorithm requires at least c1ε2
√
d / log d samples and provide an
algorithm requiring n ≥ c2ε2
√
d samples, for fixed constants c1, c2.
Here, we show that this sample complexity can be dramatically improved by replacing labeled
examples with unlabeled samples. We first define an analogue of UAT-FT to leverage unlabeled data
in this setting. For training an adversarially robust classifier, the algorithm in [38] computes a sample
mean of per-point estimates. We straightforwardly adapt this procedure for unlabeled data, as in
UAT-FT: we first estimate a base classifier from the labeled examples, then compute a sample mean
using fixed targets from this base classifier.
Definition 2 (Gaussian UAT-FT). Given n labeled examples (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) and m unlabeled
examples xn+1, . . . , xn+m, let wˆsup denote the sample mean estimator on labeled examples: wˆsup =∑n
i=1 yixi. The UAT-FT estimator is then defined as the sample mean wˆ =
∑n+m
i=n+1 yˆixi where
yˆi = fwˆsup(xi).
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Theorem 1 states that in contrast to the purely supervised setting which requires O(
√
d / log d )
examples, in the semi-supervised setting, a single labeled example, along with O(
√
d ) examples are
sufficient to achieve fixed, arbitrary accuracy.
Theorem 1. Consider the (θ∗, σ)-Gaussian model with ‖θ∗‖2 =
√
d and σ ≤ 132d1/4. Let wˆ be the
the UAT-FT estimator as in Definition 2. Then with high probability, for n = 1, the linear classifier
fwˆ has `∞-robust classification error at most 1% if
m ≥ c2
√
d
where c is a fixed, universal constant. The proof is deferred to Appendix F. For ease of comparison,
we consider the same Gaussian model parameters ‖θ∗‖2 and σ as used in [38]. The sample complexity
in Theorem 1 matches the sample complexity of the algorithm provided in [38] up to constant factors,
despite using unlabeled rather than labeled examples. We now turn to empirical investigation of
whether this result is reflected in practical settings.
4 Experiments
In section 4.1, we first investigate our primary question: for adversarial robustness, can unlabeled
examples be competitive with labeled examples? These operate in the standard semi-supervised
setting where we use a small fraction of the original training set as Sn, and provide varying amounts
of the remainder as Um. After observing high robustness, particularly for UAT-FT and UAT++, we
run several controlled experiments in section 4.1.2 to understand why this approach works well. In
section 4.2, we explore the robustness of UAT to shift in the distribution P (X). Finally, we use UAT
to improve existing state-of-the-art adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10, using the 80 Million Tiny
Images dataset as our source of unlabeled data.
4.1 Adversarial robustness with few labels
Experimental setup. We run experiments on the CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets, with L∞ constraints
of ε = 8/255 and ε = 0.01 respectively, which are standard for studying adversarial robustness
of image classifiers [17, 27, 50, 45]. For adversarial evaluation, we report against 20-step iterative
FGSM [23], for consistency with previous state-of-the-art [50]. In our later experiments for Section
4.2.2, we also evaluate against a much stronger attack, MultiTargeted, which provides a more
accurate proxy for the adversarial risk. As we demonstrate in Appendix E.1, the MultiTargeted
attack is significantly stronger than an expensive PGD attack with random restarts, which is in turn
significantly stronger than FGSM20. We follow previous work [27, 50] for our choices of model
architecture, data preprocessing, and hyperparameters, which are detailed in Appendix A.
To study the effect of unlabeled data, we randomly split the existing training set into a small supervised
set Sn and use the remaining N − n training examples as a source of unlabeled data. We also split
out 10000 examples from the training set to use as validation, for both CIFAR-10 and SVHN, since
neither dataset comes with a validation set. We then study the effect on robust accuracy of increasing
m, the number of unsupervised samples, across different regimes (m ≈ n vs. m n).
Baselines. We compare results with the two strongest existing supervised approaches, standard
adversarial training [27] and TRADES [50], which do not use unsupervised data. We also compare
to VAT [29], which was designed for standard semi-supervised learning but can be adapted for
unsupervised adversarial training as explained in Appendix B. Finally, to compare the benefits of
labeled and unlabeled data, we compare to the supervised oracle, which represents the best possible
performance, where the model is provided the ground-truth label even for samples from Um.
4.1.1 Main results
We first test the hypothesis that for adversarial robustness, additional unlabeled data is competitive
with additional labeled data. Figure 1 summarizes the results. We report the adversarial accuracy for
varying m, when n is fixed to 4000 and 1000, for CIFAR-10 and SVHN respectively.
Comparison to baselines. All models show significant improvements in adversarial robustness over
the baseline models. With the maximum number (32k / 64k) of unlabeled images, even the weakest
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Figure 1: Comparison of labeled data and unsupervised data for improving adversarial generalization on
CIFAR-10 (left,a) and SVHN (right,b)
UAT model, UAT-OT, shows 12.9% / 16.9% improvement over the baselines not leveraging unlabeled
data, and 6.4% / 1.8% improvement over VAT on CIFAR-10 and SVHN, respectively.
Comparison between UAT variants. We compare the results of 3 different UAT variants: UAT-
OT, UAT-FT, and UAT++. Comparing UAT-FT and UAT-OT, when there are larger number of
unsupervised samples, we observe that the UAT-FT shows a significant improvement compared to
UAT-OT on CIFAR-10, UAT-OT performs similarly to UAT-FT on SVHN. With smaller numbers of
unsupervised samples, the two approaches perform similarly. Empirically, we observe that UAT++,
which combines the two approaches, outperforms either individually. We thus primarily use UAT++
for our later experiments.
Comparison to the oracle. Figure 1 provides strong support for our main hypothesis. In particular,
we observe that when using large unsupervised datasets, UAT++ performs nearly as well as the
supervised oracle. In Fig. 1a, with 32K unlabeled examples, UAT++ achieves 54.1% on CIFAR-10,
which is 1.4% lower than the supervised oracle. Similarly, with 64K unlabeled data, in Fig. 1b,
UAT++ achieves 84.4% on SVHN which is 1.8% lower than the supervised oracle.
Conclusion. We demonstrate that, leveraging large amounts of unlabeled examples, UAT++ achieves
similar adversarial robustness to supervised oracle, which uses label information. In particular,
without requiring labels, UAT++ captures over 97.6% / 97.9% of the improvement from 32K / 64K
additional examples compared with supervised oracle on CIFAR-10 and SVHN, respectively.
4.1.2 Label noise analysis
Given the effectiveness of UAT-FT and UAT++, we perform an ablation study on the impact of label
noise on UAT for adversarial robustness.
Experimental setup. To do so, we first divide the CIFAR-10 training set into halves, where the first
20K examples are used for training the base classifier and the latter 20K are used to train a UAT
model. Of the latter 20K, we treat 4K examples as labeled, as in Section 4.1.1, and the remaining
16K as unlabeled. We consider two different approaches to introducing label noise. For UAT-FT
(Correlated), we produce pseudo-labels using the UAT-FT procedure, where the number of training
examples used for the base classifier varies between between 500 and 20K. This produces base
classifiers with error rates between 7% and 48%. For UAT-FT (Random), we randomly flip the label
to a randomly selected incorrect class. The results are shown in Figure 2.
Analysis. In Fig. 2a, in the UAT-FT (Random) case, adversarial accuracy is relatively flat between
1% and 20%. Even with 50% of the examples mislabeled, the decrease in robust accuracy is less
than 10%. At the highest level of noise, UAT-FT still obtains a 8.0% improvement in robustness
accuracy over the strongest baseline which does not exploit unsupervised data. Similarly, in the
UAT-FT (Correlated) case, robust accuracy is relatively flat between 7% and 23% noise level, and
even at 48% corrupted labels, UAT-FT outperforms the purely supervised baselines by 6.3%.
To understand these results, we believe that the main function of the unsupervised data in UAT is to
improve generalization of the smoothness loss, rather than the classification loss. While examples with
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Figure 2: Effects of label noise on adversarial (left, a) and natural (right, b) accuracies, on CIFAR-10
corrupted labels have limited utility for improving classification accuracy, they can still be leveraged
to improve the smoothness loss. This is most obvious in UAT-OT, which has no dependence on the
predicted labels (and is thus a flat line in Figure 2a). However, Figure 2a supports the hypothesis
that UAT-FT also works similarly, given its effectiveness even in cases where up to half of the
labels are corrupted. As mentioned in Section 3, because generalization gap of the classification
loss is typically already small, controlling generalization of the smoothness loss is key to improved
adversarial robustness.
Comparison to standard generalization. We compare the robustness of UAT-FT to label noise,
to an analogous pseudo-labeling technique applied to natural generalization. Comparing between
Figures 2a and 2b, we observe that with increasing label noise, the rate of degradation in robustness of
adversarial trained models is much lower than the rate of degradation in accuracy of models obtained
with standard training. In particular, while standard training procedures can be robust to random label
noise, as observed in previous work [33, 35], accuracy decreases almost one-to-one (slope -0.78)
with correlated errors. This is natural, as with a very large unsupervised dataset, we expect to recover
the base classifier (modulo the 4k additional supervised examples).
Conclusion. UAT shows significant robustness to label noise, achieving an 8.0% improvement over
the baseline even with nearly 50% error in the base classifier. We hypothesize that this is primarily
because UAT operates primarily on the smoothness loss, rather than the classification loss, and is
thus less dependent on the pseudo-labels.
4.2 Unsupervised data with distribution shift
Motivation. In Section 4.1, we studied the standard semi-supervised setting, where P (X) is the
marginal of the joint distribution P (X,Y ). As pointed out in [32], real-world unlabeled datasets
may involve varying degrees of distribution shift from the labeled distribution. For example, images
from CIFAR-10, even without labels, required human curation to not only restrict to images of the
choosen 10 classes but also to ensure that selected images were photo-realistic (line drawings were
rejected) or that only one instance of the object was present (see Appendix C of [22] for the full
labeler instruction sheet). We thus study whether our approach is robust to such distribution shift,
allowing us to fully leverage data which is not only unlabeled, but also uncurated.
We use the 80 Million Tiny Images [41] dataset (hereafter, 80m) as our uncurated data source, a
large dataset obtained by web queries for 75,062 words. Because collecting this dataset required no
human filtering, it provides a perfect example of uncurated data that is cheaply available at scale.
Notably, CIFAR-10 is a human-labeled subset of 80m, which has been restricted to 10 classes.
Preprocessing. Because the majority of 80m contains images distinct from the CIFAR-10 classes, we
apply an automated filtering technique similar to [47], detailed in Appendix C. Briefly, we first restrict
to images obtained from web queries matching the CIFAR-10 classes, and filter out near duplicates
of the CIFAR-10 test set using GIST features [31, 14]. For each class, we rank the images based
on the prediction confidence from a WideResNet-28-10 model pretrained on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
We then take the top 10k, 20k, or 50k images per class, to create the 80m@100K, 80m@200K, and
80m@500K datasets, respectively.
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Method Sup. Data Unsup. Data Network Anat AFGSM20 AMultiTar.
[45] CIFAR-10 7 - 27.07% 23.54% -
AT [27] CIFAR-10 7 WRN-28 87.30% 47.04% 44.54%
[51] CIFAR-10 7 - 94.64% 0.15% -
[23] CIFAR-10 7 - 85.25% 45.89% -
[19] ImageNet + CIFAR-10 7 WRN-28 87.1% 57.40% ≤52.9%*
AT-Reimpl. [27] CIFAR-10 7 WRN-34 87.08% 52.93% 47.10%
TRADES [50] CIFAR-10 7 WRN-34 84.92% 57.11% 52.58%
UAT++ CIFAR-10 80m@100K WRN-34 86.04% 59.41% 52.64%
UAT++ CIFAR-10 80m@200K WRN-34 85.85% 62.18% 53.35%
UAT++ CIFAR-10 80m@500K WRN-34 78.34% 58.04% 48.99%
UAT++ CIFAR-10 80m@200K WRN-70 86.75% 62.89% 55.04%
UAT++ CIFAR-10 80m@200K WRN-106 86.46% 63.65% 56.30%
Table 1: Experimental results using 80m Tiny Images dataset (as a unsupervised data) and CIFAR-10 (as
supervised data), whereAnat represents the original test accuracy,AFGSM20 represents the adversarial accuracy
under 20 step FGSM, and AMultiTar. represents the adversarial accuracy under the strong MultiTargeted
attack. WRN-k denotes the Wide-ResNet with depth k. ‘*’ indicates it is from [19] using 100 PGD steps with
1000 random restarts, an attack that we have found to be weaker than the proposed MultiTargeted attack.
Overview. We first conduct a preliminary study on the impact of distribution shift in a low data
regime in Section 4.2.1, and we finally demonstrate how UAT can be used to leverage large scale
realistic uncurated data in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Preliminary study: Low data regime
To study the effect of having unsupervised data from a different distribution, we repeat the same
experimental setup described in Section 4.1.1 where we draw Um from 80m@200K rather than
CIFAR-10. Results are given in Figure 3. For simplicity, we report our best performing method,
UAT++, in both settings: Um⊂ 80m@200K and Um⊂ CIFAR-10. First, we observe that when
using 32K images from unsupervised data, either UAT++ (80m@200K) or UAT++ (CIFAR-10)
outperforms the baseline, TRADES [50], which only uses the 4K supervised examples. Specifically,
UAT++ with 80m@200K achieves 48.6% robust accuracy, a 16.2% improvement over TRADES. On
the other hand, UAT++ performs substantially better when Um is drawn from CIFAR-10 rather than
80m@200K, by a margin of 5.5% with 32K unlabeled examples.
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Figure 3: Distribution shift on CIFAR-10
Conclusion. While unlabeled data from the same dis-
tribution is significantly better than off-distribution un-
labeled data, the off-distribution unlabeled data is still
much better than no unsupervised data at all. In the
next section, we explore scaling up the off-distribution
case.
4.2.2 Large scale regime
We now study whether uncurated data alone can be
leveraged to improve the state-of-the-art for adversar-
ial robustness on CIFAR-10. For these experiments,
we use subsets of 80m in conjunction with the full
CIFAR-10 training set. Table 1 summarizes the re-
sults. We report adversarial accuracies against two
attacks. First, we consider the FGSM [16, 23] attack with 20 steps (FGSM20) to allow for direct
comparison with previous state-of-the-art [50]. Second, we evaluate against the MultiTargeted
attack, which we find to be significantly stronger than the commonly used PGD attack with random
restarts. Details are provided in Appendix E.1.
Baselines. For baseline models, we evaluate the models released by [27, 50]. For fair comparison
with our setup, we also reimplement adversarial training (AT-Reimpl. [27]) using the same attack we
use for UAT, which we found to be slightly more efficient than the original attack. This is detailed in
Appendix A.3. We also compare to [19], which uses more labeled data by pretraining on ImageNet.
All other reported numbers are taken from [50].
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Comparison with same model. First, we compare UAT++ with three different sets of unsupervised
data (80m@100K, 80m@200K, and 80m@500K) using the same model architecture (WRN-34)
as in TRADES. In all cases, we outperform TRADES under FGSM20. When using 80m@200K,
we improve upon TRADES by 5.07% under FGSM20and 0.77% under the MultiTargeted attack.
We note the importance of leveraging more unsupervised data when going from 80m@100K to
80m@200K. However, performance degrades when using 80m@500K which we attribute to the fact
that 80m@500K contains significantly more out-of-distribution images. Finally, comparing with
the recent work of [19], we note that using more unsupervised data can outperform using additional
supervised data for pretraining.
Further analysis. We run several additional checks against gradient masking [1, 42, 43], detailed in
Appendix E. We show that a gradient-free attack, SPSA [43], does not lower accuracy compared to
untargeted PGD (Appendix E.2), visualize loss landscapes (Appendix E.3), and empirically analyze
attack convergence (Appendix E.4). Overall, we do not find evidence that other attacks could
outperform the MultiTargeted attack.
A new state-of-the-art on CIFAR-10. Finally, when using these significantly larger training sets,
we observe significant underfitting, where robust accuracy is low even on the training set. We thus
also explore using deeper models. We observe that UAT++ trained on the 80m@200K unsupervised
dataset using WRN-106 achieves state-of-the-art performance, +6.54% under FGSM20and +3.72%
against MultiTargeted attack, compared to TRADES [50].
5 Conclusion
Despite the promise of adversarial training, its reliance on large numbers of labeled examples has
presented a major challenge towards developing robust classifiers. In this paper, we hypothesize that
annotated data might not be as important as commonly believed for training adversarially robust
classifiers. To validate this hypothesis, we introduce two simple UAT approaches which we tested
on two standard image classification benchmarks. These experiments reveal that indeed, one can
reach near state-of-the-art adversarial robustness with as few as 4K labels for CIFAR-10 (10 times
less than the original dataset) and as few as 1K labels for SVHN (100 times less than the original
dataset). Further, we demonstrate that our method can also be applied to uncurated data obtained
from simple web queries. This approach improves the state-of-the-art on CIFAR-10 by 4% against
the strongest known attack. These findings open a new avenue for improving adversarial robustness
using unlabeled data. We believe this could be especially important for domains such as medical
applications, where robustness is essential and gathering labels is particularly costly [15].
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Overview
The appendices are organised as follows. Appendix A provides additional details on the experiments
in Section 4. Appendix B details our implementation of VAT [29] adapted for L∞ adversarial
robustness. Appendix C provides additional details on the 80m@N dataset generation procedure.
Appendix D details code release. Appendix E includes additional experiments for the adversarial
evaluation of our trained models, as well as checks against gradient masking. Finally, we include the
proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix F.
A Experimental Details
A.1 Implementation notes
Model architecture. For all experiments, we use variants of wide residual networks (WRNs) [48].
In Section 4.1, we use a WRN of width 2 and depth 28 for SVHN and a WRN of width 8 and depth
28 for CIFAR-10. We explore increasing the depth of the network (while keeping width to be 8) to
34, 70 and 106 in Section 4.2.2.
Data preprocessing. We use standard data augmentation techniques for images. For CIFAR-10,
4-pixel padding is used before performing random crops of size 32x32 and random left-right flip. For
SVHN, 4-pixel padding is also employed before random crops of size 32x32 followed by random
color distortions.
Pseudocode. We provide pseudocode for our particular implementations of each UAT variant. To
simplify notation, when writing (x, y) ∼ Um, the target y is always the fixed target pseudo-label
(which is unused in UAT-OT). Recall that these pseudo labels are obtained from a model trained on
Sn alone. Lˆadvand LˆOT are the empirical estimates of the robust loss from [27] (as in UAT-FT) and
LOT respectively, as defined in the next section.
Algorithm 1 UAT-OT update
Input: Weight hyperparameter λ, batch sizes bs and bu
Sample bs labeled examples (xs,ys) ∼ Sn and bu unlabeled examples (xu,yu) ∼ Um
Compute loss L = Lˆadv(xs,ys; θ) + λ( bsbu )LˆOT (xu,yu; θ)
Update with gradient g = ∇θL
Algorithm 2 UAT-FT update
Input: Batch sizes bs and bu
Sample bs labeled examples (xs,ys) ∼ Sn and bu unlabeled examples (xu,yu) ∼ Um
Merge x = [xs;xu]; y = [ys;yu]
Compute loss L = Lˆadv(x,y; θ)
Update with gradient g = ∇θL
Algorithm 3 UAT++ update
Input: Weight hyperparameter λ, batch size bs and bu
Sample bs labeled examples (xs,ys) ∼ Sn and bu unlabeled examples (xu,yu) ∼ Um
Merge x = [xs;xu]; y = [ys;yu]
Compute loss L = Lˆadv(x,y; θ) + λLˆOT (x,y; θ)
Update with gradient g = ∇θL
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Loss implementations. In the above, the empirical estimates of the losses are defined as follows:
Lˆadv(x,y; θ) = 1|(x,y)|
|(x,y)|∑
i=1
sup
x′i∈N(xi)
xent(yi, pθ(·|x′i))
LˆOT (x,y; θ) = 1|(x,y)|
|(x,y)|∑
i=1
sup
x′i∈N(xi)
D(pθˆ(.|xi), pθ(.|x′i))
We always approximate each maximization with 10-steps of PGD, as described in Appendix A.3. For
LˆOT , there are two implementational details of the attack which are not obvious from the pseudocode.
• When computing LˆOT in UAT-OT, we solve the adversarial optimization with a “hard-
label” rather than “soft-label” attack. That is, rather than maximizing the KL directly, we
take the hard label yˆ = argmaxy pθ(y|x) and run a PGD attack using yˆ as the label. We
suspect this is because when pθ(y|x) is not completely one-hot, we are maximizing a convex
objective. There are (at least) two issues due to this. First, the gradient of the KL, evaluated
at x, is 0, since p(y|x) is the global minimum. Second, if the random initialization x′
causes p(yˆ|x′) > p(yˆ|x), then the gradient will encourage increasing p(yˆ|x′), rather than
decreasing it. While previous work in [50] finds that initializing to a random perturbation
of x allows PGD to effectively maximize the KL, using hard labels worked better in our
experiments.
• When computing LˆOT in UAT++, we reuse the adversarial example computed to maximize
Lˆadv , for computational efficiency.
In both cases, the model loss is still a KL divergence.
Loss weights. For all experiments, we used λ = 5 for both UAT-OT and UAT++. We fixed these
values based on early experiments.
Differences with distribution shift. For our off-distribution experiment in Section 4.2.2, we make
two changes to accomodate distribution shift. First, we compute the loss on the labeled and unlabeled
examples using separate forward passes through the network. Without batch norm, this has no
effect on the computation. With batch norm, we observe this helps slightly, perhaps because the
off-distribution unlabeled data degrades the local batch statistics. Second, we downweight the loss
of unlabeled examples by a factor of bs/bu (this corresponds to averaging the loss across examples
within each separate batch, rather than summing). We suspect that while label noise has little effect,
distribution shift degrades performance, and so focusing more on in-distribution examples is helpful.
Batch sizes. Throughout Section 4.1, we use batch sizes proportional to the dataset size. In other
words, given labeled and unlabeled datasets Sn and Um, for a total batch size of B = 128, we use
bs = BN/(N +M) and bu = BM/(N +M). This ensures we perform an equal number of passes
through each dataset, and helps avoid overfitting the (small) labeled dataset. For our high data regime
experiment in Section 4.2.2, we use fixed bs = 512 and bu = 4096.
Optimization. We use the SGD with momentum optimizer for all training jobs. For all training jobs,
we use weight decay (L2 regularization) weighted by 5× 10−4.
In Section 4.1.1, we use a total batch size of 128, for 25K steps with an initial learning rate of 0.2
which is decreased by a factor 10 at iterations 15K, 18K and 20K. This schedule was fine-tuned
using the validation set.
In Section 4.2, we use the same learning rate schedule of [50]’s public repository is used for CIFAR-10,
i.e. initiate with 0.2, then dividing by 10 after 15K and 22K steps.
A.2 Negative results and observations
We note several observations we made while running experiments. Note that these are much less
carefully examined than the results reported in the main paper. Indeed, we suspect that some of these
observations may be specific to our specific training setup. However, we include these as we believe
they may nonetheless be helpful for future researchers:
13
• We merge (pseudo)-labeled and unlabeled batches when possible, since this improved robust
accuracy, particularly in the small-data regime (when using smaller batch sizes) We suspect
this is due to more reliable local batch statistics in batch normalization, since with small
batch sizes, the labeled batch can be quite small.
• We found learning rate schedules to be particularly important. For example, in Table 1, the
primary difference between our reimplementation of adversarial training, and the implemen-
tation in [27] is we use the significantly shorter schedule from [50], which improves robust
accuracy by ~3%.
• With our current choices for λ, we notice a strong regularizing effect from LˆOT . While
UAT-FT reaches nearly 100% train robust accuracy by the end of training, the same schedule
used with UAT-OT or UAT++ stays below 80% train robust accuracy.
• When using LˆOT on unsupervised data, we noticed it was necessary to either use fixed
parameters θˆ for computing the target prediction, or to also use fixed targets on the unlabeled
data. When both these are missing, the model would learn to predict a uniform class
distribution for images in the unsupervised dataset. While such models achieve high training
accuracy, test set accuracy stays close to random, even on unperturbed images. On labeled
data, both versions with and without backpropagating into target predictions work fine, as
reported in [50].
• We tried combining UAT with the recent semi-supervised UDA method [47] but did not see
significant improvements in adversarial accuracy.
• We experimented with alternative normalization strategies such as InstanceNorm [44] and
GroupNorm [46], but observed slightly worse results.
A.3 Projected gradient descent (PGD) details
We provide additional details on our untargeted PGD attack, which we use for adversarial training.
The untargeted attack optimizes the margin loss objective proposed in [8]
Jadvθ (x) = Z(x, θ)y −max
i 6=y
Z(x, θ)i ,
where Z(x, θ)i denotes the logit for class i, predicted by model θ on input x, and y denotes the true
label. The margin loss is negative if and only if x is misclassified.
We optimize this objective with projected gradient descent [23, 27] using the Adam optimizer [21].
Consistent with prior work (e.g. [8, 26]), we find these modifications to improve attack convergence
speed when compared to using the negative cross-entropy loss or vanilla gradient updates. During
training, we perform 10 steps of optimization, as in [50].
B Implementation note on VAT baseline implementation
Recall that for UAT-OT, we use the loss introduced in [29] and also used in [50]
LOTunsup(θ) = E
x∼P (X)
sup
x′∈N(x)
D(pθˆ(.|x), pθ(.|x′)), (3)
where D is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, and θˆ indicates a fixed copy of the parameters θ in order
to stop the gradients from propagating.
In practice, computing the optimal perturbation x′ (in supx′∈N(x)) cannot be achieved in closed
form, hence approximations have to be proposed. In [29], the authors start from a second order Taylor
approximation of D(pθˆ(.|x), pθ(.|x′)), then use a combination of finite differences to efficiently
approximate the Hessian and power iteration method to find an estimate of the optimal perturbation.
Their end goal being standard generalization, they observe that only one iteration of the power
method is sufficient for good performance. This specific procedure (Hessian approximation and
eigenvector estimation though power method) is specifically tailored to the case where the chosen
specification for the adversary corresponds to the L2 ball: N(x) = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ }, whereas
we focus on the L∞ ball type of constraints.
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For fair comparison, we adapt their algorithm to the L∞ ball by replacing the previously mentioned
procedure by one step of FGSM with learning rate equal to .
UAT-OT mainly differs from VAT in the fact that we instead use 10 steps of PGD to estimate x′.
Looking at Figure 1 in the main paper, UAT-OT clearly outperforms VAT, indicating that when it
comes to adversarial generalization, one has to use a stronger adversary to generate the perturbation.
C Dataset Details
We detail the procedure used to generate the 80m@N datasets, used for experiments in Section 4.2.
To remove exact and near duplicate images, we follow [14] and use the GIST image descriptors [31]
provided with the 80 Million Tiny Images dataset [41]. For every image, we compute the L2 distance
to its nearest neighbor in the CIFAR-10 test set, as measured in GIST feature space, and remove
all images within distance 0.28, totalling roughly one million images. Following this, we manually
checked for near duplicates, by random sampling and visualizing L2 nearest neighbors. In our initial
version of this paper, we removed only exact duplicates, which produced robust accuracies roughly
0.5 - 2% higher across all experiments.
For filtering, we use a WRN-28-10 [48] model trained on CIFAR-10, which achieves 96.0% accuracy
on the CIFAR-10 test set. Following the procedure used for the original CIFAR-10 dataset [22], for
each class in CIFAR-10, we use hyponyms of the class name, based on the Wordnet hierarchy [28].
This leaves roughly 2 million images remaining, though the class distribution is highly non-uniform
(of these, 1 million correspond to the “dog” class, while just 50000 correspond to “deer” or “frog”).
For each image, we record the probability assigned by the pretrained model to the associated class.
We restrictto images with associated probability over 0.5, and take the top N/10 images per class.
For the 80m@500K dataset, some classes contain less than 50K such examples. In this case, we
randomly duplicate examples, to maintain class balance. Finally, we note that although we use
a simple procedure here, and did not experiment with alternatives, we believe developing better
procedures to exploit uncurated data is an important and underexplored research direction.
D Code Release
We are in the process of open-sourcing our trained models, as well as the 80m@N datasets we used
to train them. We will update the paper with a link when they are available.
E Adversarial Evaluation Details
E.1 Multitargeted attack evaluation
We provide additional details on our MultiTargeted attack, which we have found to be signif-
icantly stronger than commonly used PGD attacks, at the cost of increased computation. Our
MultiTargeted implementation is equivalent to the untargeted attack described above, but rather
than performing a single optimization, instead runs a targeted attack against each possible class, and
returns the image which minimizes the untargeted loss. The targeted margin loss is
Jadvθ (x) = Z(x, θ)y − Z(x, θ)t ,
where t is the target class. We use 200 steps with 20 random restarts for each class.
We have found the MultiTargeted attack to reliably outperform untargeted PGD attacks (version
1: with 200 steps and 20 random restarts; version 2: with 100 steps and 1000 restarts), which in
turn reliably outperform FGSM20. For example, for our strongest model, trained on the 80m@200K
dataset, the FGSM20adversarial accuracy is 63.65%, the untargeted PGD adversarial accuracy is
(version 1) 61.10% and (version 2) 60.90%, and the MultiTargeted adversarial accuracy is 56.30%.
E.2 SPSA evaluation
As an additional check against gradient masking [1, 43], we run a gradient-free attack, SPSA [43],
against our strongest model, UAT++ trained on the 80m@200K unsupervised dataset. For SPSA,
we use a batch size of 8192 with 40 iterations. We obtain 64.9% adversarial accuracy, similar to the
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61.1% obtained by untargeted PGD. We further observe in Figure 4 that SPSA and PGD reliably
converge to similar loss values, and that SPSA rarely outperforms PGD. This provides additional
evidence that the model’s strong performance is not due to gradient masking.
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Figure 4: Analysis of gradient masking with SPSA: We compare the final values of the margin
loss across different images, between PGD and SPSA. Each point represents a single image, which
is misclassified when Jadvθ (x) < 0. Overall, we find that SPSA and PGD converge to similarly
adversarial perturbations (points close to the line y = x). We observe relatively few images where
SPSA outperformed PGD (below the line, shown in red). The upward bend in the dots to the left of
−3 are an artifact due to the fact that we terminate the SPSA attack early, once we find any image
with margin loss below −3.
E.3 Loss landscape analysis
As another check against gradient masking, we look at the adversarial loss landscape from our
strongest model. We examine the loss surfaces for four images where the MultiTargeted attack
succeeded, but untargeted PGD attack, with 200 steps and 20 restarts, did not. Figure 5 shows the
untargeted adversarial loss (optimized by PGD) around the nominal image from CIFAR-10. In these
loss landscapes, we vary the input along a linear space defined by the worse perturbations found by
PGD and a random direction. The u and v axes represent the magnitude of the perturbation added
in each of these directions respectively and the z axis represents the loss. For figures on the right
hand side of Figure 5, they show a top-view of the loss landscape and indicates that a large portion
of L∞ ball around the nominal image pushes the PGD solution towards the right (rather than the
bottom). We observe that the loss landscape is rather smooth, which provides (weak) additional
evidence that the strong performance is not due to gradient masking.
E.4 Attack convergence analysis
As another check against gradient masking, we analyzed the convergence of PGD. Figure 6 shows
convergence of untargeted PGD across different random restarts for our strongest model, though we
also observe similar patterns across other models. We observed that on randomly selected images,
PGD quickly converges, and that the final loss values across random restarts are tightly clustered,
indicating PGD likely converges to near-optimal perturbations. Figure 6a shows randomly selected
images, and is consistent with what we observe across images where MultiTargeted and PGD
agree. In the fraction of cases where MultiTargeted succeeded but PGD did not, we can find
evidence of gradient masking on some images through random restarts. In Figure 6b, there are two
images where the final loss varies across different random restarts.
F Proof of Theorem 1
F.1 Preliminaries
We first provide the following two concentration inequalities which we will use to bound our main
quantities of interest.
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Lemma 3 (Concentration of χ-squared distribution). Let X ∼ N (0, σ2In). Then, provided α2 >
2nσ2,
P(‖X‖2 ≥ α2) ≤ e−α2/(20σ2).
Proof. The result follows from application of Lemma 1 from [25].
Lemma 4. Let X ∼ N (0, σ2Im) in Rm. Then
P( 1m‖X‖1 ≥ a) ≤ 2m exp−
ma2
2σ2
Proof. Forming the Chernoff bound with t = maσ2 , we have:
P( 1m‖X‖1 ≥ a) ≤ exp−
ma2
σ2
E[exp
a
σ2
‖X‖1]
= exp−ma
2
σ2
(
E[exp
a
σ2
|X1|]
)m
= exp−ma
2
σ2
(
exp
a2
2σ2
(1 + erf a
σ
√
2
)
)m
= exp−ma
2
σ2
exp
ma2
2σ2
(
(1 + erf a
σ
√
2
)
)m
≤ 2m exp−ma
2
2σ2
F.2 Main Proof
To bound the robustness, there are two main quantities of interest. First, we need to bound the norm
of z = 1m
∑m
i=1 yˆixi, which controls the smoothness of the classifier (Lemma 5). Second, we need
to bound the inner product 〈z, θ∗〉, which controls how well the classifier fits the data (Lemma 6).
The main difficulty is that
∑m
i=1 yˆixi is not Gaussian distributed. In particular, while
∑m
i=1 yixi
follows a Gaussian distribution, our quantity of interest does not, due to the dependence of yˆi on xi.
Lemma 5. Given a (θ?, σ) Gaussian model in Rd, let h : Rd → {−1,+1} be any classifier.
If z = 1m
∑m
i=1 yˆixi is the sample mean vector of m i.i.d. samples based on predicted classes
yˆi = h(xi), then we have
P
(
‖z‖2 ≥ (1 + c)‖θ∗‖2 + 2σ
√
d
m
)
≤ e−6
√
d/5,
with c =
√
20σ
‖θ∗‖
√√
d
m + log 2.
Proof. We have∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆixi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆi(yiθ
∗ + zi)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖θ
∗‖
m
m∑
i=1
yˆiyi +
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆizi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖θ∗‖+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆizi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
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where zi ∼ N (0, σ2I). We therefore have
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆixi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ t
)
≤ P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆizi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ t− ‖θ∗‖
)
≤ P
( ⋃
s1=±1,...,sm=±1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
sizi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ t− ‖θ∗‖
)
≤
∑
s
P
(
1
m
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
sizi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ t− ‖θ∗‖
)
Observe that
∑m
i=1 sizi ∼ N (0,mσ2). Now, using the concentration of measure result, whenever
t− ‖θ∗‖ ≥
√
2
mσ we have:
P
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
sizi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≥ m2(t− ‖θ∗‖)2
 ≤ e−m2(t−‖θ‖)2/(20mσ2) = e−m(t−‖θ‖)2/(20σ2)
Hence, we obtain
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆixi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ t
)
≤ 2me−m(t−‖θ∗‖)2/(20σ2).
Let t = (1 + c)‖θ∗‖+ 2σ
√
d
m . Then, we have
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
yˆixi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ t
)
≤ 2me−m
(
c‖θ∗‖+2σ
√
d
m
)2
/(20σ2)
≤ 2me−m(c2‖θ∗‖22/(20σ2))e−m4σ2 dm/(20σ2)
= 2me−m(c
2‖θ∗‖22/(20σ2))e−d/5
Now let c =
√
20σ
‖θ∗‖2
√√
d
m + log 2. Then, the above probability is given by
2me
−m
(√
d
m +log 2
)
e−d/5 = e−
√
de−d/5 ≤ e−
√
de−
√
d/5 = e−6
√
d/5.
Lemma 6. Under the conditions of Lemma 5, let p = E[I[h(x) = y]] denote the accuracy of
classifier h. Then we have
P
(
〈z, θ∗〉 ≤ ( 74p− 1) ‖θ∗‖2 −√2‖θ∗‖σ
√
log(1/δ)
m
+ log 2
)
≤ (0.995)mp + δ.
Proof. We write
P (〈wˆ, θ∗〉 ≤ t) = P
(
〈 1
m
m∑
i=1
yˆixi, θ
∗〉 ≤ t
)
= P
(
〈 1
m
m∑
i=1
yˆi(yiθ
∗ + zi), θ∗〉 ≤ t
)
,
where zi are N (0, σ2I). The expression inside the probability is equal to
‖θ∗‖22
m
m∑
i=1
yˆiyi +
1
m
m∑
i=1
〈yˆizi, θ∗〉
We bound this expression from below with
‖θ∗‖22
m
m∑
i=1
yˆiyi − 1
m
m∑
i=1
|〈zi, θ∗〉|
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(That is, we consider the worst-case scenario where the random variables yˆi are given by the negative
of the sign of 〈zi, θ∗〉). We therefore get that
P (〈wˆ, θ∗〉 ≤ t− t′) ≤ P
(
‖θ∗‖22
m
m∑
i=1
yˆiyi − 1
m
m∑
i=1
|〈zi, θ∗〉| ≤ t− t′
)
≤ P
(
‖θ∗‖22
m
m∑
i=1
yˆiyi ≤ t
)
+ P
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
|〈zi, θ∗〉| ≥ t′
)
= P
(
2‖θ∗‖22
m
m∑
i=1
I[yi = yˆi]− ‖θ∗‖22 ≤ t
)
+ P
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
|〈zi, θ∗〉| ≥ t′
)
We treat the first term. Let t =
(
7
4p− 1
) ‖θ∗‖2. The first probability term is hence given by
P
(
m∑
i=1
I[yi = yˆi] ≤ 7
8
mp
)
≤ exp
(
− mp
2 · 82
)
≤ (0.995)mp.
using a Chernoff bound.
We have the following concentration bound on the `1 norm of the Gaussian vectors U ∼
N (0, ‖θ∗‖2σ2):
P
(
1
m
‖U‖1 ≥ t′
)
≤ 2m exp (−t′2m/(2‖θ∗‖2σ2)) ,
by applying Lemma 4. We set t′ =
√
2‖θ∗‖σ
√
log(1/δ)
m + log 2, and when plugging in the above
formula, we obtain
P
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
|〈zi, θ∗〉| ≥ t′
)
≤ δ.
Hence, we obtain the desired bound.
We now use these results to achieve the final result in Theorem 1. In what follows, we assume:
• (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) are drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ) Gaussian model in Rd with mean
norm ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d
• h : Rd → {−1,+1} is a base classifier with accuracy p > 34 , where p = E[I[h(x) = y]]
• z ∈ Rd is the sample mean vector z = 1m
∑m
i=1 yˆixi, where yˆi = h(xi)
• wˆ ∈ Rd is the unit vector in the direction of z, i.e., wˆ = z/‖z‖2
• c denotes the constant in Lemma 5
Lemma 7. Under these assumptions,
P
[
〈wˆ, µ〉 ≤
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2mσ2 log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
]
is bounded above by exp(−6√d/5) + (0.995)mp + exp(−d/2σ2).
Proof. By Lemma 6, we have
P
[
〈z, θ∗〉 ≥ ( 74p− 1) ‖θ‖2 −√2‖θ‖σ
√
log(1/δ)
m
+ log 2
]
≥ 1− (0.995)mp − δ.
Further, by Lemma 5, we have
P
(
‖wˆ‖2 ≤ (1 + c)‖θ‖+ 2σ
√
d
m
)
≥ 1− e−6
√
d/5,
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Conditioning on both events with δ = exp(−d/2σ2), the overall failure probability is bounded by
exp(−6√d/5) + (0.995)mp + exp(−d/2σ2). Then, we have
〈wˆ, µ〉 = 〈z, µ〉‖z‖2
≥
(
7
4p− 1
)
d−√2dσ
√
log 1/δ
m + log 2
(1 + c)
√
d+ 2σ
√
d
m
=
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm− σ√2√log 1/δ +m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
=
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
For ease of reference, we provide a relevant lemma proved in [38].
Lemma 8 ([38]). Assume a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model. Let p ≥ 1, ε ≥ 0 be robustness parameters,
and let wˆ be a unit vector such that 〈wˆ, θ?〉 ≥ ε ‖wˆ‖∗p., where ‖·‖∗p is the dual norm of ‖·‖p. Then
the linear classifier fwˆ has `εp-robust classification error at most
exp
(
− (〈wˆ, θ
?〉 − ε ‖wˆ‖∗p)2
2σ2
)
.
Lemma 9. With probability at least 1− [exp(−6√d/5) + (0.995)mp + exp(−d/2σ2)], the linear
classifier fwˆ has `ε∞-robust classification error at most β if
ε ≤ 1√
d
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
− σ
√
2 log 1/β
d
Proof. We follow the approach used for Theorem 21 in [38]. Define
α =
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
so that we can rewrite
ε ≤ 1√
d
α− σ
√
2 log 1/β
d
By Lemma 7, we have that 〈wˆ, θ?〉 ≥ α with probability at least 1− [exp(−6√d/5) + (0.995)mp +
exp(−d/2σ2)].
exp
(
− (〈wˆ, θ
?〉 − ε√d)2
2σ2
)
.
Since
〈wˆ, θ?〉 − ε
√
d ≥ α−
(
1√
d
α− σ
√
2 log 1/β
d
)√
d = σ
√
2 log 1/β,
the robust classification error is bounded above by β, as desired.
Lemma 10. Assume σ ≤ 132d1/4 and p > 0.99. Then, with probability at least 1− [exp(−6
√
d/5)+
(0.995)mp + exp(−d/2σ2)] the linear classifier fwˆ has `εp-robust classification error at most 0.01 if
m ≥
{
100 for ε ≤ 14d−1/4
256 ε2
√
d for 14d
−1/4 ≤ ε ≤ 14
.
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Proof. We first apply Lemma 9 which gives a `ε
′
∞-robust classification error at most β = 0.01 for
ε′ =
1√
d
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
− σ
√
2 log 1/β
d
≥ 1√
d
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
− 1
8
d−1/4
The remainder is simple algebraic manipulation. First, we consider the case where ε ≤ 14d−1/4. Using
m = 100, we first bound
c =
√
20σ√
d
√
1
md
1/2 + log 2
≤
√
20
32
d−1/4
√
1
100d
1/2 + log 2d1/2
≤
√
20
32
d−1/4
√
d1/2
≤ 1
5
The resulting robustness is
ε′ ≥ 1√
d
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
− 1
8
d−1/4
=
(
7
4p− 1
)√
m−
√
1 + 2σ2md−1/2 log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
− 1
8
d−1/4
≥
7
10
√
100−
√
1 + 200σ2d−1/2 log 2
6
5
√
100 + 2σ
− 1
8
d−1/4
≥
7−
√
1 + 200322 log 2
12 + 116d
1/4
− 1
8
d−1/4
≥
7−
√
1 + 200322 log 2(
12 + 116
)
d1/4
− 1
8
d−1/4
≥ 1
4
d−1/4
≥ ε
Next, we consider the case where 14d
−1/4 ≤ ε ≤ 14 . We again bound c:
c =
√
20σ√
d
√√
d
m
+ log 2
≤
√
20
32
d−1/4
√
1
162ε2
+ log 2
≤
√
20
32
d−1/4
√
42
√
d
162
+ log 2
≤
√
20
32
√
42
162
+
log 2√
d
≤ 1
5
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The resulting robustness is
ε′ ≥ 1√
d
(
7
4p− 1
)√
dm−
√
d+ 2σ2m log 2
(1 + c)
√
m+ 2σ
− 1
8
d−1/4
≥ 1√
d
(
7
4p− 1
)√
162ε2d3/2 −
√
d+ 2 1322 (16
2ε2)d log 2
16(1 + c)εd1/4 + 116d
1/4
− 1
2
ε
=
(
7
4p− 1
)
(16ε)−
√
d−1/2 + 162322
log 2
2 d
−1/2ε2
16(1 + c)ε+ 116
− 1
2
ε
≥
(
7
4p− 1
)
(16ε)−
√
d−1/2 + 16232242
log 2
2 d
−1/2
4(1 + c) + 116
− 1
2
ε
≥
11.5ε− 4ε
√
1 + log 2128
4 65 +
1
16
− 1
2
ε
≥ ε
as desired.
Corollary 11. Let (x0, y0) and (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ) Gaussian model
with corruption parameter p and mean norm
√
d. Let wˆsup = y0x0. Let z ∈ Rd be the sample
mean z = 1m
∑m
i=1 yˆixi, where yˆi = fwˆsup(xi). Let the UAT-FT estimator wˆ ∈ Rd be the unit
vector in the direction of z, i.e., wˆ = z/‖z‖2. Assume σ ≤ 132d1/4. Then, with probability at least
1− [exp(− 6
√
d
5 )+(0.996)
m+exp(− d2σ2 )−2 exp(− d8σ2+1) )], the linear classifier fwˆ has `εp-robust
classification error at most 0.01 if
m ≥
{
100 for ε ≤ 14d−1/4
256 ε2
√
d for 14d
−1/4 ≤ ε ≤ 14
.
Using the given restriction on σ, we can invoke Corollary 19 from [38] with β = 0.01. Thus,
with probability at least 1− 2 exp(− d8σ2+1) ), the classification error p of the base classifier fwˆsup
is less than 0.01. Conditioning on this event, we can invoke Lemma 10 with m as given, which
yields a robust classification error of fwˆ of at most 0.01, with probability at least 1− [exp(− 6
√
d
5 ) +
(0.996)m + exp(− d2σ2 ).
A union bound gives the desired total failure probability.
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Figure 5: Adversarial loss landscapes around the nominal images. It is generated by varying the
input to the model, starting from the original input image toward either the worst attack found using
PGD (u direction) or the one found using a random direction (v direction). For the figures on the left
hand side, the z axis represents the loss. For both panels, the diamond-shape represents the projected
L∞ ball of size  = 8/255 around the nominal image.
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(a) Convergence on randomly sampled images
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(b) Convergence on images where MultiTargeted attack succeeded but untargeted PGD did not
Figure 6: Convergence of PGD. Each plot shows the convergence of the adversary loss on the same
image, across 20 random restarts. On randomly sampled images (top), the loss converges to tightly
clustered values. On images where PGD did not find optimal perturbations (bottom), we observe
variation in perturbation strength across different restarts for two images in the bottom row.
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